Introduction: energy, geopolitics and development
" [on] e of the fundamental tasks of the State is to striate the space over which it reigns" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2002 [1980] : 385)
The expansion of (sustainable) electricity access in Africa is increasingly hailed as fundamental to poverty eradication but in rolling out thousands of kilometres of electricity transmission lines, African states are also able to extend their reach and authority, to more effectively 'striate the space' over which they reign. Electricity infrastructures (and the capture and control of flows associated with them) help constitute the state as a visible actor in the everyday lives of rural people whilst the arrival of electricity affects state-citizen relationships in various ways (Winther, 2008) . As Mitchell (2011: 7) has shown, examining the socio-technical and political worlds built with energy resources and the social and material properties of electricity reveals a great deal about the different ways of engineering political relations and making political connections out of flows of energy but also about the impacts on existing hierarchies and inequalities in institutions and practices. Energy infrastructures, including electricity generation, transmission and distribution facilities, are sites of contestation and have played a significant role in processes of nation-building, modernization and development (Calvert, 2016) and in imaginations of national sovereignty (Huber, 2015) .
In Mozambique, the discovery of coal reserves estimated at more than 23 billion tonnes and gas deposits of more than 100 trillion cubic feet (IEA, 2014) has raised the prospect of massive resource wealth that could be used to address longstanding challenges of energy poverty as the extractives boom has begun to spur investments in domestic power (Hanlon and Nuvunga, 2015) . The costs and benefits of energy extraction and generation have however been experienced unevenly both socially and spatially and despite plentiful energy resources, Mozambique faces the paradoxical situation of widespread and persistent domestic energy poverty (Kirshner and Power,Authors, 2015) . Although estimates vary, the country has some of the lowest electrification rates in Africa along with acutely uneven geographies of electricity access, as the national grid reaches only about one fifth of its 23 million inhabitants 1 (World Bank, 2015) .
Electricity infrastructures represent an important physical medium through which to express state authority, to extend the reach of the state and its capacity to administer. Electricity has become a potent symbol of what the state can do for citizens, and in return it serves as an important instrument in generating state legitimacy. In this paper we argue that examining electricity infrastructures can uncover important features of the political ordering of space and provide valuable insights into emergent political geographies. Examining the nexus of energy, geopolitics and development in Africa, we suggest, is highly instructive and can reveal a great deal about how states come into effect or increase their visibility, how they seek to 'read' and translate their territories and citizens and how they enlist and enrol them in state-led projects of modernisation and development. For the state to take on meaning and importance in the lives of un-served rural residents and to forge connections with them, this process "not only has to be enacted through festivals or parades but must also command the attention of citizens through large-scale [infrastructural] efforts as part of what characterizes the state as something that stands apart from society" (Harris, 2012:39) .
From the wires, poles, and generators themselves to the entrepreneurs, engineers, 1 Firewood and charcoal make up to 81% of the total energy consumed in Mozambique (Cuvilas et al, 2010) . politicians, and donors who drive and determine the process of electrification, electrical grids can create power and politics just as they transmit it and can perform and enable (or disable) social formations in important ways (Shamir, 2013) .
In their study of clean energy development in Kenya, Newell et al (2014) highlight the ways different forms of power relations combine to determine the scope for enhanced energy access. This includes institutional power (where does power lie within and across government and how far is it reinforced or undermined by actors beyond the state, especially donors?); material power (who controls the finance, technology and means of producing electricity and 'clean energy') and discursive power (who defines what is regarded as clean, green and affordable energy, how are the energy needs of the poor represented and for whose benefit?) (Newell et al, 2014) . Our analysis builds on this conceptual approach in tracing how these forms of power combine in the Mozambican context, while supplementing this with a focus on the spatiality of energy infrastructures. As the state is composed of multiple relations within and beyond national boundaries, we examine the spatial dynamics of state power in Mozambique, its territoriality and how it is brought to bear on energy systems.
The paper adopts a political economy approach that examines the discourses, institutions and interests that influence electricity policy and provision and the implications for enhancing energy access. It examines the role of electricity infrastructures in extending the power and reach of the state, in narrating the state's presence and in enabling particular forms of elite accumulation and subject formation. We argue that electricity provision in
Mozambique plays an important role in statecraft and provides accumulation opportunities The paper begins by introducing the key features of Mozambique's energy system. The second section sets out our conceptualisation of the state in Mozambique and provides a brief overview of the recent literature on the intersections between electricity and the state in Africa, while also drawing on examples from industrialized states. A third section introduces our methodology and sets out the context for our research before we then examine the particular configuration of institutional and material power guiding electrification efforts in Mozambique, the accumulation opportunities it creates, and the interests it serves for those connected to the party-state. A final section examines how, under the cover of rural electrification, the state has sought to extend its reach and authority and enhance the power of its institutions along with the role that electrification plays in extending the market, in wider neoliberalisation and in creating regular bill-paying, neoliberal consumer-subjects. The conclusion reflects on the prospects for transforming the colonial spatialities of Mozambique's energy system and for extending energy access.
Mozambique's energy system
Mozambique's electricity system (see figure one) has developed as a patchwork of three separate systems that lack interconnection, particularly between the southern and central systems, along with an ageing transmission system and a distribution network that connects all administrative centres but leaves large swathes of the country without a power grid (Cuamba et al, 2013) . EDM integrated these previously dispersed production units inherited from the colonial period and began expanding the grid, but after decades of underinvestment many of the facilities are now obsolete or requiring rehabilitation (Cipriano et al, 2015) .
Hydropower has been the main source of electricity supply in Mozambique to date, accounting for 95% of total generation (Cipriano et al, 2015) . EDM´s available generation capacity comes from Cahora Bassa and several smaller hydropower facilities (Corumana, Mavuzi and Chicamba), yielding roughly 565 MW in total (Cipriano et al, 2015) . Since 2011, with increased demand from the domestic population, load has exceeded this capacity, creating the need for Independent Power Producers (IPPs) or costly imports from within the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)(ibid). According to the government's load forecasts, average growth in demand of 12.5% is expected over the coming years, necessitating an extra 100 MW in electricity generation capacity (and additional infrastructure for its distribution) every year (Cipriano et al, 2015) . In order to meet the this rising projected growth in demand, the state has increasingly begun to outsource for energy provision
through the licensing and divestment of generation operations to Independent Power Producers (IPPs), several of which seek to use newly-exploited hydrocarbon resources to construct new coal-and gas-fired power plants linked to the grid network, increasing supply but also prices too (Nhamire and Mosca, 2014) .
After the adoption of Marxism-Leninism, Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique or the Mozambique Liberation Front) moved quickly to centralise economic and political control so that the state could be harnessed for the task of modernizing the nation (cf. Pitcher, 2002) . Throughout the post-liberation period Frelimo has prioritised national unity and the expansion of territorial control (Bertelsen, 2016) with the extension and control of electricity infrastructures regarded as one means to achieve this. During Mozambique's devastating Civil War (1977 War ( -1992 ) the promise of electrification accompanied Frelimo's campaign to persuade peasants to join the communal villages that were the centrepiece of its socialist ideology (Geffray, 1991) while the South African-backed counter-revolutionary militia Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) specifically targeted key infrastructures (including electricity) for attack as a means to confront and "dehierarchize" the emerging state order (Bertelsen, 2016: 39) .
As early as 1981, Renamo forces dynamited pylons near Espungabera in Manica province on the border with Zimbabwe, reducing electricity exports by 50% (AIM, 1981) and during the war itself, Renamo repeatedly sabotaged the dam's power lines, as the state lacked the capacity to protect the 4,000 pylons which cut across 900km of remote countryside, 1400 of which were destroyed by Renamo in 1988 alone (Anderson, 2016) . The cost of repairing the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  R  e  v  i  e  w  O  n  l  y   8 power lines was estimated at US$500 million-almost three times the total value of Mozambican exports (Isaacman and Sneddon, 2003 ).
Mozambique's electricity infrastructure remains heavily oriented towards resource extraction and regional markets-given the government's need for foreign exchange derived from these exports-and its development has been shaped by colonial experiences and the extractive mercantilist capitalism that structured the colonial economy (Castel-Branco, 2010) . At the centre of Mozambique's electricity system is the Cahora Bassa dam, completed in 1974 on the Zambezi in the northern province of Tete (see Figure 1 ). Hailed as a testimony to Portugal's 'civilizing mission' and framed in high modernist ideology, the dam was billed as a means of extending Portugal's colonial territorial reach and authority. Construction began in 1969 with the project financed by the sale of cheap electrical power to South Africa in exchange for support in the colonial war (Isaacman and Isaacman, 2013; 2015) .
During the 1960s, Frelimo waged a guerrilla campaign to block construction of the dam, but it was completed just six months prior to Mozambican independence and the newlyinstalled Frelimo government had little alternative but to discard its long-term opposition and 'domesticate the white elephant' as President Samora Machel put it, seeking to turn an exploitative colonial project into a national asset, a symbol of liberation which would be instrumental in the 'socialisation of the countryside'. Hidroeléctrica Cahora Bassa (HCB), the state-owned company which manages the dam and sells power to EDM, began operations in (Sebitosi and Da Graca, 2009) . Electricity in Mozambique is thus a transboundary issue with several neighbouring states importing electricity from Cahora Bassa. According to some observers, Cahora Bassa is the world's largest dam in the world constructed for the specific purpose of exporting energy (Isaacman and Isaacman, 2015) . This internationalisation of electricity -the transfer across national borders of electric power and the fuel, capital and ownership required to generate itmakes it vulnerable to many of the same strategic concerns linked to oil, including disruption of supply, volatile prices, and struggles over control of resources and infrastructures (Bridge and LeBillon, 2013) . In the next section we review the literature that guides our theorisation of the state in Mozambique and informs our analysis of how electricity infrastructures and electrification initiatives not only enable particular forms of state power and (neoliberal) (Painter, 2006) . Feminist, anthropological, and poststructuralist approaches have however begun to reorient attention away from formal state institutions toward socially embedded processes through which ideas of the state are reproduced. States do not simply exist; rather, they are accomplishments reified and reformulated through everyday activities (Painter, 2006 State power is in part the capacity of infrastructures to order, arrange and make legible (Scott, 1998) . High-modernist infrastructure schemes established to enhance electrification and promote energy for 'development', given their associations with scientific and technological 'progress', expanding production, mastery of nature and the rational design of social order, represent an important part of the ways in which the state performs and narrates its presence and comes into being as a 'socio-natural effect' (Harris, 2012) . Scott (1998: 2) writes of the 'blindness' of the state and about legibility as "a central problem of statecraft", the gradual resolution of which enables the state to get a better handle on its subjects and their environment through a more permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. Building on this work, we contend that the extension of electricity infrastructures helps with the process of seeing (and being seen to act) like a state. Electrification may not always improve a state's ability to measure, record and monitor its territory and citizenry but it can be understood as one of many attempts made by the state to achieve a more permanent greater visibility and to 'read' or 'translate' its territory and citizenry. Extension into previously un-electrified space is regarded as a way of enhancing the state's capacity to administer and allows the state to project and amplify its authority and reach more people.
Technologies and infrastructures are not merely symbols or tools for political expression; rather, they are a political terrain for the negotiation of moral-political questions, and it is in the politics of electricity infrastructures that such questions are negotiated and contested (von Schnitzler, 2013) . In this sense, it is important to examine how infrastructure matters politically (Meehan, 2014) and how it comes to mediate a diversity of political projects and conflicts concerning questions around, for example, basic needs, political recognition or the (Meehan, 2014: 216) . Electricity infrastructures can (in their partiality)
limit the jurisdiction of the state but they can also sustain modern societies and generate political and economic difference among groups and individuals (Shamir, 2013) . Their topologies of connection and isolation create new publics and political identities but also spaces for resistance (Luque-Ayala and Silver, 2016).
Extending electricity services to households means extending 'progress' through the range of appliances and household items that claim to improve quality of life and allow people to
participate in "what is considered a modern lifestyle" (Labban, 2012: 389) . Electrification is therefore a process that guarantees "dual access": peoples' access to electricity and thus to modernity, but also the access of the market to more people "expanding quite literally with the extension of the electric grid" (Labban, 2012: 389) . Novel forms of prepayment are seen to widen access to utilities (including electricity) in low-income areas and empower citizens, especially the poor but they also help to advance neoliberal-style reforms while using an empowerment narrative, seeking to discipline consumers, and often benefiting only privatized service providers (see McDonald, 2009; Baptista, 20153) . This is particularly relevant in Mozambique where, from 2005, EDM introduced Credelec, a system of prepaid electricity to consumers extending to all the district town seats, whilst 88% of EDM clients connect to the grid through a prepaid meter (Baptista, 2015,; 2017) . In this way electrification enables the state to enrol its citizens as bill-paying consumers, as neoliberal subjects. Beyond this, the materiality of its infrastructure gives electricity a centralising effect. Power plants that generate electricity and distribute it through a broad network centralise command over the network, the flow of electricity through it, and "the accumulation of money flowing in the opposite direction" (Labban, 2012: 390) .
Although there is now a growing literature on electricity in the global South that considers its "dialectical relationship to social infrastructures and political institutions" (Gupta, 2015: 563), relatively few contributions have explicitly considered the relationships between electricity and the state in Africa. Winther (2008) In many studies of electrification in Africa, the process is viewed apolitically, as a largely technical and logistical process of widening connections and 'plugging' consumers into a grid infrastructure. Electrification is understood here as part of the 'will to improve' underpinning development interventions and exemplifies the practice of 'rendering technical' (Li, 2007) state-owned electricity production via the public utility Eskom, cheap labour and large-scale national and international corporate capital tightly bound to the energy and mining sector.
This work emphasizes the historical relationship between the state and capital in ways that are highly relevant to Mozambique, as is the idea of providing industry with heavily Several studies of the connections between electricity and political power undertaken in highly industrialized contexts are also relevant here. Geographers, sociologists and historians of technology have examined the ways that networks of electricity infrastructure are deeply implicated in the reproduction of political and economic power (Hughes, 1993) . For example, Granovetter and McGuire (1998: 149) examine the formation of the electricity industry in the US in the early 20 th Century. They show how its specific form and structure emerged, not because it was the most technically and economically efficient, but because a set of powerful actors accessed certain techniques and applied them "in a highly visible and profitable way". This process triggered pressures for uniformity across all regions of the US, even when it excluded viable alternative technologies and organizational forms, such as decentralized provision, or co-generation systems, in homes and factories. Harrison (2013) examines the uneven development of electricity networks in North Carolina in the US South, and the centralization of capital into a single provider along with implications for energy poverty and injustice. Going further, Harrison (2016) traces the use of racial categories in rural electrification planning in North Carolina during the New Deal 1930s, analysing the ways in which race was used to readjust projections of electricity consumption and the Collectively, these different literatures inform our approach by enabling us to conceptualise the state relationally, as incomplete, emergent and becoming and as processual, socially embedded and uneven. They allow us to trace how electricity infrastructures and electrification initiatives constitute an important way in which the state is enacted in and through everyday spaces but also how they become part of the state's attempts to order, arrange and translate its territory and citizens, to make them more legible. Finally, the focus on the national and regional political economies of electricity infrastructures (and how they are shaped by material, discursive and institutional forms of power) (Newell et al, 2014) informs our analysis of how electrification serves elite interests and enables strategies of accumulation but also how it allows the state to enrol its citizens as bill-paying subjects of neoliberal capitalist development.
Setting the context: methods and approach
Our research formed part of a larger project on the 'Rising powers' and low carbon energy transitions in Southern Africa (Power et al, 2016) . [REDACTED FOR PEER REVIEW]. The initial aim of our research was to examine the ways in which (re) emerging economies, specifically
Brazil, India and China, have influenced energy pathways in southern Africa through various roles, investments and interventions. This research was concerned with the political economy of energy transition and involved examining the discourses, institutions and interviews with donor organizations, diplomatic staff, small businesses and NGOs engaged with the energy sector to get a sense of the wider non-state discourses and narratives around electrification and energy access and to triangulate them with those articulated by public officials. In these interviews, we sought information on institutional histories, energy development priorities, investment strategies, donor engagements and locational characteristics. In addition to mapping the particular institutional and material configuration of power around electricity our primary objective was to explore the (highly political) process of narrating expanding energy access and so discourse analysis was used to critically interpret the interview materials. "worthwhile to pursue how postcolonial state formation is imagined and experienced from its margins-that is, from provinces beyond Maputo and from circumstances of impoverishment external to the powerful centers of political and economic elites".
We thus wanted to explore not just how the state regards electricity infrastructures as a means to advance state formation but also of better 'connecting' citizens at its margins to these centres of political and economic power. In doing so, we sought to get a sense of how the state understood electrification infrastructures as a means to increase its visibility and enhance its power to govern, administer and order rural areas and to 'read' and 'translate' its territory and citizens along with the ways in which and how electrification affected statecitizen relations.
We also draw on archival research conducted at the Mozambican News Agency (Agência de Informação de Moçambique, AIM), extensive desk-based studies and our earlier involvement in a variety of research projects based in Mozambique to understand the broader energy and political histories at play in the country. The authors are proficient in Portuguese and In what follows, we draw on these methods to explore how electrification has become a means through which the state seeks to establish political authority and counter its 'blindness' in peripheral spaces whilst enabling elite accumulation.
Electricity, capitalism and state power
Mozambique's configuration of institutional power is focused on the ruling party Frelimo, which following liberal transition after the end of civil war in 1992 has consolidated its hold whilst the party's effective monopolization of access to donors and international networks, together with the privatization process (cf. Castel-Branco, 2014; Hanlon, 2004) have enabled it to blur the lines between party and state and to "centralize wealth and power in ways that were impossible under socialism" (Sumich, 2010: 681) . Privatization has helped to create a small national business class linked to the party and after winning all five post-war elections Frelimo, as an elected one-party state, has been able to monopolise power, rents and rentseeking (Macuane, Buur and Monjane, 2017). Consequently, the postcolonial state has been variously represented "as a machinery to thwart and tap cycles of exchange and extract life substances" albeit one "lacking redistributive elements" (Bertelsen, 2016: 224) to notions of Mozambique as a "gangster democracy characterized by sharp inequalities" (Cramer, 2007: 269) . It is important however to avoid the tendency to reduce the state to a "onedimensional mechanism of exploitation usurped and employed by self-serving elites" (Bertelsen, 2016: 14) . Kirshner and Power, authors, 2015) .
Key to At the centre of this vision are high-modernist plans, developed through MIREME, for the construction of several large-scale hydropower facilities. The state has actively sought foreign investment to catalyse these projects (which also require increases in transmission capacity) so as to lure energy-intensive industries and boost regional electricity exports (Interview, African Development Bank, November 1 st , 2013). This is also part of Frelimo's wider promotion of national unity, securing its consent to stay in power, while countering recent calls from opposition party Renamo for autonomous governance at the provincial 2015) . These large hydro facilities (see figure one for locations) are also intended to showcase Mozambique's recent economic growth and its impending modernity for both citizens and foreign investors whilst enabling the state to make its presence felt in rural regions.
The largest hydroelectric scheme is the 1500 MW capacity Mphanda Nkuwa dam, sited 60 km downstream from Cahora Bassa which is estimated to cost US$4.2 billion, and with the transmission system needed to export power costed at a further US$1 billion (World Bank, 2015) . Although information in the public domain about the projects has been very minimal, investment is mostly coming from China's Exim Bank in collaboration with private-sector Brazilian construction conglomerate Camargo Corrêa, the Mozambican investment company Energia Capital (a subsidiary of Insitec, linked to former President Guebuza) and EDM (TBY, 2016) . Once completed, about 75% of the generated power will be sold to Eskom with 15%
to Zimbabwe and the remaining 10% used for domestic consumption with the justification given that Mozambique has only a limited transmission infrastructure available to distribute electricity across rural areas (Ibid). The project, in the works since 2013, was originally tendered, without public competition, to a consortium composed of EDM (20%); Insitec (40%) and Camargo Corrêa (40%) (Nhamire and Mosca, 2014) . Projected to displace 1400 households and indirectly affect the livelihoods of a further 200,000 Mozambicans, Mphanda Nkuwa represents a startling example of 'post-colonial amnesia,' as the memory of displacement and ecological damage from Cahora Bassa is erased (Isaacman and Sneddon, 2003: 38-9) . and Cortez, 2015) . EDM officials have also often set up independent companies to provide the goods and services required for its electrification process, and at the local level there is evidence that EDM has become a source of petty corruption involving company technicians (Nhamire and Mosca, 2014) .
Despite these accusations and critiques, EDM's operations as a state-owned company are guided by its "social mandate" to extend connections domestically (Interview, EDM, Given the recent shift towards IPPs, EDM has begun to outsource for energy provision, frequently without open competition or public tendering (Nhamire and Mosca, 2014) .
Through EDM and MIREME, the state has joined a range of multinational firms such as the Brazilian mining multinational Vale and the Scottish power generation company Aggreko, to build industrially-oriented generation facilities (Cipriano et al, 2015) . One example of this, a Guebuza) has a 26% stake (MacauHub, 2016) . Through these IPP projects, Frelimo's political and business elites engage in profit-making opportunities around new energy generation projects, largely for their own benefit.
These wider national and regional political economies around electricity infrastructures Indeed, it could be argued that the export-orientation required by neoliberal models of capitalist development pushes many African states towards producing energy for export and away from serving the needs of the poor. In part, these efforts reflect ongoing neoliberalisation in the electricity sector in African contexts (McDonald, 2009) . Across the Global South, governments have unbundled and privatized large public utilities, facing pressure from lenders to reduce corruption and the clientelist distribution of services. Yet it is often unclear that political influence in the sector has been reduced; in some cases, the constellation of actors has expanded following privatization (Maclean and Brass, 2015) . In contrast to the jubilant era of the 1960s, when developmental states in Africa were the primary actors responsible for increasing energy access by expanding a centralized, national electric grid, the contemporary juncture of neoliberal globalisation has seen a growing range of private, non-state actors becoming involved with electrification and "NGO-business hybridisation" in the sector increasing (ibid: 59). Further, with decentralized and privatized solutions to energy poverty, it increasingly becomes the household's responsibility to install renewables such as solar panels in homes, with the state withdrawing from energy provision (McDonald, 2009) . In Mozambique, the World Bank has mediated this process, urging reform of the electricity sector and the mobilizing of private capital for the building of power plants, advocating tariff increases and FUNAE has partnered with several donor agencies in deploying RETs in projects for the provision of electricity for social uses in off-grid environments, such as school lighting, water pumping, and vaccine refrigeration. These projects use localised mini-grids or stand-alone systems that supply electricity for public services, including clinics, schools and teachers' and nurses' residences.
Statecraft and rural electrification
FUNAE is a public agency, yet in some ways it has incorporated neoliberal thinking in its approach, joining donors and development agencies in discursively articulating rural electrification as an 'enabler' of rural development, propelling activities in agriculture, trade, industry, health and education, attracting new investments and improving livelihoods. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 60
Donors frequently articulate the notion that rural dwellers must quickly be brought into neoliberal modernity through a discourse of 'connectivity,' and that improved access to modern energy services will lead to the extension of market exchange in rural areas (cf. Labban, 2012; Kale, 2014 ). FUNAE's vision interpolates with these discourses in which offgrid energy access is seen to champion the advance of the market in previously disconnected rural spaces, along with the idea that doing so will enablinge a wider and unfettered dissemination of development (Kale, 2014) .
Despite its focus on decentralized energy, FUNAE operates mostly in a centralised, 'topdown' fashion, with its headquarters and decision-making located in Maputo, whilst local communities remain recipients of receive energy and other infrastructure that is planned and decided by the state and investors. FUNAE's procurement and supply-based model has succeeded in rolling out energy service projects to expand coverage, but often with limited local consultation or commitment to capacity building. The approach focuses on connecting rural institutions, such as government offices, clinics and primary schools, rather than providing direct access for households. The agency considers households connected if they live within a 20-km radius of these connected institutions (Interview, FUNAE Manica Office, November 3rd, 2013). Local participation in shaping electrification, whether on-grid or offgrid, typically consists of a space in which non-state actors are invited to be 'consulted' or to give consent to an initiative, rather than proactively shape such a space (Castan Broto et al, 2014 ).
During fieldwork, we observed that much of what FUNAE does is focused on the centralized delivery of electricity and seeks to strengthen the power of rural state institutions while 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r R e v i e w O n l y 29 making the state's presence felt among residents. Rural electrification in this sense is a means through which the state is enacted and comes into being in and through everyday spaces and infrastructures whilst enhancing the state's institutional capacity to order, arrange and translate its territory and citizens and increase their legibility. Many of its projects however rarely have connections that extend to a distance greater than 20 km and are seldom sited in the most remote areas of a district such that. Nhamire and Mosca (2014: 61) suggest that in this sense it is somewhat "fallacious to speak of rural electrification" (Nhamire and Mosca, 2014: 61) . Others, however, view the electrification of rural schools and clinics as a substantial "step in improving rural wellbeing" in isolated contexts with limited capital investment and caution the need to be realistic about the available options of project recipients (chiefly that they formally become bill paying consumers) the agency also plays a key role in the state's fashioning of neoliberal subjectivities.
In Majaua-Maia, Zambézia province, an EU-financed mini-hydro project has rehabilitated a hydraulic system used on a late colonial maize plantation in the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, there was little participation in decision-making among residents in the delivery of electricity. In particular, the system bypassed a local mill, used by local women to grind corn for xima, a staple food. This was a priority among residents who spoke with us, as women must travel long distances to a diesel-powered milling facility, located across the Ruo River in
Malawi. Local residents are expected to pay for the electricity service, without much consideration of their ability to do so, or how they will use the new electricity to meet their own needs. Nor was there consideration of the new expectations created, many of which require support, such as maintenance, service or training.
The sociotechnical electricity infrastructures installed by FUNAE typically serve the more affluent in rural regions, such as shopkeepers, local officials and other government workers, although the extent to which the rural poor have benefited remains unclear and requires further research. In FUNAE's case, the installation process can be costly for customers and often overlooks local energy needs as the goal is mainly to bring electricity to the district town seats and administrative centres, to appear in government statistics that claim electrification to be a socially and spatially more inclusive effort than it is in practice. 
Conclusions: Electrification, state power and neoliberal subjectivities
The tentacles of electrification can be regarded as a central element of "modernity at large" (Appadurai, 1996, Winther and Wilhite, 2016 citizens. We suggest that it is highly productive to examine the nexus between geopolitics, energy and development in Africa and to locate the study of everyday spaces of state power in and around electricity infrastructures as they represent a key means through which state formation is enacted and contested in daily life.
One of Mahatma Gandhi's critiques of electrical power was the worry that it would bring centralised control over the lives of people in remote villages and prevent communities from becoming self-sufficient for their energy needs (Kale, 2014:28) . It is not the case however that the extension of electrical power has immediately brought more centralised control over people and places in Mozambique, but it is regarded by the state as a key means by which to perform and narrate development and improve its capacity to administer and govern its territory and citizens. Whilst the state has claimed that grid extension to rural spaces is a key priority, much infrastructural investment has focused on connecting urban and semi-urban district capitals and provincial centres whilst rural electrification has been Electricity infrastructure represents an important means through which the state seeks to counter its 'blindness' in peripheral spaces and although in Mozambique it hasn't yet improved the state's ability to measure, record and monitor, an expanding grid network and off-grid energy systems help the state to achieve a more permanent visibility, to extend the state's presence and begin to enhance its power and capacity to order and arrange and to Electricity infrastructures, we have argued, also help to enlist and enrol citizens as subjects of state-led modernity and development. We drew attention to the discursive power of state agencies like FUNAE in framing energy access problems and solutions and advancing the idea that rural energy users must quickly be brought into neoliberal modernity through a discourse of 'connectivity'. The normative assumption is that all individuals should be connected to the grid, but the necessity and desirability of life on the grid are seldom questioned (Gupta, 2015) and little consideration is given to how poor people can afford to pay for it. this relatively expensive product. Energy access is framed as key to the extension and intensification of market exchange into rural areas, enabling and facilitating 'development' but the process also in part creates neoliberal subjectivities. Electrification allows the state to advance its vision of neoliberal development and to enrol its citizens within that its vision of development as modern, bill-paying consumers and subjects (Baptista, 2015; Labban, 2012 MacauHub ( 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
